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Hunter: The Municipal Action Exemption to the Federal Antitrust Laws: Inc

THE MUNICIPAL ACTION EXEMPTION TO THE
FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS: INCREASED
ANTITRUST EXPOSURE FOR
WYOMING CITIES AND TOWNS
Congress enacted the federal antitrust laws to prohibit monopolies and
unreasonable restraint of trade.' Since 1943, state action has been exempted from the antitrust laws. 2 Until 1978, many commentators and
municipal attorneys assumed that municipalities would be entitled to immunity under the state action exemption. 3 In 1978, however, the United
States Supreme Court held that municipalities were not exempt from antitrust laws unless they had acted pursuant to a state policy displacing competition. 4 Four years later, the Court held that municipalities would not be
exempt unless they had acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition. This comment will
discuss the application of the Court's "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy" test in the federal appellate courts. Following
discussion of federal appellate decisions, the comment will discuss whether
Wyoming municipalities will be able to claim exemptions from the federal
antitrust law. In conclusion, the author suggests that the Wyoming
Legislature enact legislation which will exempt Wyoming municipalities
from the antitrust laws.
BACKGROUND

The Supreme Court first recognized a state action exemption from the
antitrust laws in Parker v. Brown.5 In Parker, a private raisin grower
challenged a California regulatory program which stabilized the price of
raisins. The California Legislature enacted the program to prevent overproduction by the state's raisin growers.6 The program allowed raisin
growers to establish production zones. Following the establishment of the
production zone, the State Director of Agriculture selected growers to
serve on a program committee. The program committee was given authority to administer the program. Generally, the program committee controlled the distribution of the raisin crop. Producers were allowed to sell 30% of
their crop through ordinary commercial channels and were required to pool
their remaining crops. The program committee took possession of the pooled raisins, and later distributed the raisins to commercial packers. The
committee coordinated the distribution of raisins with the market demand
for raisins, and the committee could not sell the raisins for less than market

value.
The district court found that the program violated the Sherman Act.7
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Sherman Act8 did not apply
1. 1 E. KITNER, FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAWS § 1.1 (1980).
2. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
3. G. LASHUTKA & D. VANSCOY, AFTER BOULDER: ANALYZING MuNICIPAL

ANTITRUST

Ex-

POSURE (unpublished manuscript presented at the National League of Cities Conference
on Local Government and the Antitrust Laws, April 30, 1983 at Houston, Texas).
4. Lafayette v. Louisiana Power and Light, 435 U.S. 389 (1978) (plurality opinion).

5. 317 U.S. 341 (1943).
6. Brown v. Parker, 39 F. Supp. 895, 901 (1941).
7. Id. at 901-02.
8. The Sherman Act is the cornerstone of the federal antitrust policy. 1 E. KITNER, supra
note 1, § 4.1. The first two sections of the act prohibit monopolies, and contracts, corn-
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to state action.9 The Court's holding was based primarily on the Act's
legislative history, which suggested that the Act's purpose was to prevent
restraints of trade by private individuals and corporations. 10 The Court
carefully limited its holding to those activities which were conducted pursuant to state authority. The state, for instance, could not grant immunity
by authorizing violations of the Act, or by simply declaring that unlawful
actions were lawful. To be exempt from the antitrust laws, the state had to
impose the challenged restraint as a governmental act. 1 The Court found
that California's raisin stabilization programs was clearly a governmental
act. Although private raisin growers administered the program, the state
had established the procedure for organizing the production zones. The
state also promulgated the regulatory provisions of the program and had
placed restrictions on the exercise of the program committee's powers.
For the next thirty-two years the Court did not elaborate on the state
action exemption set forth in Parker.In 1975, however, the Court decided
the first of a series of cases which effectively limited the Parkerdecision to
state agencies and private individuals acting pursuant to governmental
authorization. In Goldfarb v. State Bar of Virginia,12 the plaintiff challenged a mandatory fee schedule, enforced by the Virginia State Bar. The state
bar claimed that the fee schedule was required by state law. In Virginia, the
state legislature had authorized the supreme court to regulate the practice
of law. Pursuant to their delegated power, the Virginia Supreme Court had
adopted ethical codes. The state bar claimed that the adopted ethical codes
required mandatory fee schedules. The Court denied the exemption,
however, finding that the ethical codes did not mandate or require mandatory fee schedules.' s Although the Court relied on Parkerfor the proposition that anticompetitive activities were not exempt unless required by
binations, or conspiracies that restrain competition among the states and foreign nations.
Section one requires dual action, the plaintiff must prove the existence of a contract, combination, or conspiracy that restrains trade.
Section One provides;
§ 1. Trusts, etc., in restraint of trade illegal; penalty.
Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in
restraint of trade or commerce among the several states, or with foreign nations, is declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any contract or
engage in any combination or conspiracy hereby declared to be illegal shall be
deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine
not exceeding one million dollars if a corporation, or, if any other person, one
hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by

both said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 1 (1982).
Section Two prohibits monopolies and conspiracies or attempts to monopolize. Sec-

tion Two of the Sherman Act provides:

§ 2. Monopolizing trade a felony; penalty.

Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not
exceeding one million dollars, if a corporation, or, if any other person, one hundred thousand dollars or by imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both
said punishments, in the discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (1982).
9. Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 350-51 (1943).
10. Id. at 351.
11. Id. at 352.
12. 421 U.S. 773 (1975).
13. Id. at 790-792.
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the state, it failed to acknowledge that in Parker, the California
Legislature had not requiredproducers to establish production zones. The
activities were required by the state only after private raisin producers had
voluntarily established the production zones. Regardless, the Court held
that a private organization would not be exempt from antitrust liability
unless the state had required or mandated anticompetitive conduct. 14
The Court further refined the state action exemption in Cantor v.
DetroitEdison.15 In Cantor, a private utility company had established a
free light bulb distribution program in order to increase consumer demand
for electricity. Although the utility was regulated by the Michigan Public
Service Commission, no state statutes or agency regulations required or
even addressed the distribution of free light bulbs. The Public Service Commission, however, had approved the light bulb distribution program in a
tariff order. State law required the utility to obey tariff orders issued by the
Public Utilities Commission. A retail druggist who sold light bulbs brought
an antitrust action claiming that the utility had violated the antitrust laws.
The Court denied the exemption, finding that the State had not compelled Detroit Edison's light bulb distribution program.' 6 Although the
Michigan Public Utilities Commission had participated in the decision to
provide free light bulbs, Detroit Edison had primary responsibility for initiating the program. The Court reasoned that it would be fundamentally
unfair to hold a private entity liable for antitrust violations unless the state
had compelled or mandated the anticompetitive conduct.
In 1978, the Court applied the state action exemption to municipalities.
In Lafayette v. LouisianaPower and Light,'7 two Louisiana municipalities
which owned and operated electric utilities brought an antitrust action
against an investor owned electrical company. The company counterclaimed, alleging that the municipalities had violated the antitrust laws by including anticompetitive provisions in debentures, engaging in sham litigation to prevent the construction of a nuclear power plant, and by requiring
customers outside the city to purchase electricity in order to obtain gas and
water. The municipalities claimed immunity based on the state action exemption set forth in Parker. The municipalities argued that they were
agents of the state government, so the state action exemption applied
equally to both the state and its municipalities.
The Court disagreed, relying in a prior decision which had interpreted
the Sherman Act's legislative history.18 In Parker,the Court had held that
Congress had passed the Sherman Act to prevent restraints of trade by
private individuals. 19 In Lafayette, however, the Court ignored its Parker
interpretation of Congress' purpose in passing the Sherman Act and relied
on a more recent Court decision involving antitrust violations by a private
corporation, in which they had reviewed the Sherman Act's legislative
14. Id. at 790-791.
15. 428 U.S. 579 (1976).
16. Id. at 590-598.
17. 435 U.S. 389 (1978). (Plurality opinion).
18. Id. at 398.
19. 317 U.S. at 351.
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history and concluded that Congress sought to establish economic competition as the fundamental principle governing commerce. 2 0 Based on its later
interpretation of Congress' purpose in passing the Sherman Act, the Court
concluded that exemptions would be granted only when a conflicting funoutweighed the importance of encouraging economic
damental policy
21
competition.
The state action exemption set forth in Parkerwas based on notions of
federalism. 22 In Lafayette, the Court did acknowledge that the Constitution
created a governmental structure of federalism, and therefore congressional intent to nullify state governmental acts would not be lightly inferred. In the federal structure, however, there are no sovereign cities, so the
set
court reasoned that the federalism behind the state action exemption
28
forth in Parkerwas not applicable to municipal governments.
Although the Court found that municipalities were not entitled to the
state immunity doctrine enunciated in Parker, the Court held that a
municipality would be exempt if its actions had been authorized or directed
by the state. 24 While the authorization did not have to be specific and detailed, the Court held that sufficient state authorization would be found if the
legislature "contemplated the kind of action complained of."25 The Court
examined state statutes and found that the Louisiana Legislature had not
authorized anticompetitive practices by municipalities. 26 In fact, one state
statute expressly provided that
municipalities were not immune from
27
federal or state antitrust laws.
Chief Justice Berger wrote a concurring opinion in which he argued
that the Sherman Act applied only to proprietary municipal functions. 28
Municipalities which owned and operated electric utilities were not engaged in traditional governmental functions. In his view, therefore, the two
Louisiana municipalities were subject to the antitrust laws.29
The dissenting justices argued that the majority's decision would
adversely affect the allocation of power between state and municipal
governments.8 0 In the federal system of government, states have broad
discretion to delegate governmental powers to municipalities. The dissenting justices recognized that delegation of governmental power served two
important functions. First, state government are not burdened with purely
local matters. Thus, state government may expend their limited resources
solving state wide problems. Municipalities, furthermore, are more effec20. 435 U.S. at 398.
21. Id. at 401-02.

22. Id. The Court recognized a second fundamental policy: the Noeer-Penningtondoctrine.
The Noeer-Penningtondoctrine exempts concentrated efforts to influence public officials,
even if the purpose of asserting influence is to restrain competition. United Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657,670 (1965). TheNoeer-Penningtondoctrine is based on the first amendment right to petition the government.
23. 435 U.S. at 412.
24. Id. at 414-15.
25. Id. at 415.
26. Id. at 414 n.44.
27. Id.
28. Id. at 418-26.
29. Id. at 424.
30. Id. at 434-40.
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tive in regulating matters of local importance. The dissenting justices concluded that if municipalities were subject to antitrust liability almost every
routine decision would have to be authorized by the state. State authorization of all municipal actions would increase state control over
municipalities and reduce the flexibility of municipal governments to
regulate local matters.31
The dissenting justices also argued that the majority's municipal action
test was vague and unworkable. 2 The justices recognized that few states
maintain an adequate legislative history. In addition, few statutes expressly authorize anticompetitive conduct. Therefore, an attempt to find
legislative intent to displace competition would be simply a "creation of
judicial imagination." '3
Two years after the Lafayette decision, the Court reformulated the
state action exemption. In CaliforniaRetail Liquor DealersAssociation v.
Midcal Aluminum, Inc.,34 a wine wholesaler brought an antitrust action
claiming that a state wine pricing system constituted a resale price
maintenance system.35 A unanimous Court set forth a two prong test,
derived from previous state action cases involving state agencies and
private individuals. First, the challenged restraint had to be carried out
under a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed [ ] state
policy." 3 6 Second, the policy must be actively supervised by the state.37 The
court found that the wine pricing system had been carried out pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, because the
legislative policy was "forthrightly stated and clear in its purpose" to allow
the resale price maintenance system.38 The court denied an exemption,
however, because the pricing system had not been actively supervised by
the state.39
In Community Communications Co. v. City ofBoulder,40 the Court applied the Midcal Aluminum test to municipal action. In Boulder, a cable
television franchise brought an antitrust action after Boulder passed a
moratorium which prohibited further expansion of cable television service.
Boulder claimed that its regulation of cable television was exempt from the
antitrust laws.
First, Boulder argued that its regulation of cable television constituted
the action of the state in its sovereign capacity. Boulder based its argument
on the Home Rule Amendment of the Colorado Constitution. 41 As con31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.

Id. at 435.
Id. at 435-40.
Id. at 437.
445 U.S. 97 (1980).
Resale price maintenance systems involve agreements between entities standing in a vertical relationship. 2 E. KrrNER, supranote 1,§§ 10.15, 10.2. An example of a resale price
restriction is an agreement between a wholesale seller and a retail buyer, requiring that
the retailer sell goods at a specified price.
445 U.S. at 105.
Id.
Id.
Id, at 105-06.
455 U.S. 40 (1982).
Id. at 52-53.
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strued by the City of Boulder, the Home Rule Amendment vested in
Boulder "every power theretofore possessed by the legislature... in local
and municipal affairs. '42 Therefore, Boulder argued that its regulation of
the action of the State of Colorado in its
cable television constituted
4
sovereign capacity.

3

The Court rejected Boulder's argument. 44 The Court emphasized that
Parker was based on principles of federalism. Federalism, however,
governs the allocation of power between federal and state governments.
Regardless of a municipalities political status under state law, the court
held that cities are not sovereign in our Constitutional system. Unless
Boulder could prove that it had regulated cable television pursuant to a
expressed state policy, it would not be
clearly articulated and affirmatively
45
exempt from the antitrust laws.

The Court held that the Home Rule Amendment was not a "clearly ar-

ticulated and affirmatively expressed" state policy. 46 Citing Lafayette,

Boulder argued that the legislature had contemplated Boulder's anticompetitive conduct when it granted powers under the Home Rule
Amendment. The Court responded by noting that the state's position
toward anticompetitive conduct was one of mere neutrality. Under the
Home Rule Amendment, a Colorado municipality could regulate cable
television in an anticompetitive manner while another municipality could
elect to provide free market competition. The Court concluded that the
Home Rule Amendment failed to indicate legislative intent to allow the
action. Therefore, Boulder was subject to the
challenged anti-competitive
47
antitrust laws.

Because the Court found that Boulder had not acted pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, the Court did
supervision" prong of the Midcal test
not decide whether the "active state
4
was applicable to municipalities.
In Lafayette, the Court held that municipalities were subject to the antitrust laws unless their activities had been authorized by the state.
Although the authorization did not have to be specific and detailed, the
legislature must have "contemplated the kind of action complained of."'49
The clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy test set
forth in Boulder requires a clearer showing that the legislature intended to
displace competition. Rather than merely contemplating the action complained of, the legislature must forthrightly state and declare that its purpose is to permit the challenged anticompetitive conduct.
42. Id. at 52.

43. Id. at 53.
44. Id. at 53-54.
45. Id. at 54.
46. Id. at 54-55.
47. Id. at 55-57.
48. Id. at 51 n.14.
49. 435 U.S. at 415.
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FEDERAL APPELLATE DECISIONS

The "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy" test
has been applied in a number of antitrust actions against municipalities.
Generally, the federal courts have held that the active state supervision
prong of the Michael test is inapplicable to municipalitiesY ° The Federal
Courts have liberally construed state statutes in order to find that the state
legislature intended to displace competition.
Application of the Boulder Test
In Pueblo Aircraft Service v. City of Pueblo,51 the Tenth Circuit held
that the City of Pueblo was entitled to an antitrust exemption. In Pueblo,
the City of Pueblo had leased portions of its municipal airport to fixed base
operators. The leases required each fixed base operator to purchase its
aviation fuel from Pueblo's storage facility. Pueblo Aircraft Service
challenged the lease provisions after Pueblo leased the airport to another
fixed base operator. The district court granted an exemption, finding that
Pueblo had operated the airport pursuant to powers granted by the Home
Rule Amendment of the Colorado Constitution.62 The Tenth Circuit Court
of Appeals affirmed the district court, shortly after the Supreme Court
decided Boulder.53 Although the Tenth Circuit relied on Boulder, its decision is not consistent with the Supreme Court's analysis. The Tenth Circuit
relied on a Colorado statute which declared that airport operation was a
governmental function.
The statute provided:
The acquisition of any lands for the purpose of establishing airports
or other air navigation facilities; the acquisition of airport protection privileges; the acquisition, establishment, construction,
enlargement, improvement, maintenance, equipment, and operation of airports and other air navigation facilities; and the exercise
of any other powers granted in this part 1 to any county, city and
county, city, or town are hereby declared to be public governmental functions, exercised for a public purpose, and matters of public
iecessity; and such lands and other property, easements, and
privileges acquired and used in the manner and for the purposes
enumerated in this part 1 are hereby declared to be acquired5 4and
used for public purposes and as a matter of public necessity.
The statute contained no language indicating legislative intent to
displace competition. The statute merely-declared that the airport operation was a governmental function.56 Specific anticompetitive conduct was
50. See Gold Cross Ambulance Service & Transfer v. City of Kansas City, 705 F.2d 1005,
1014 (8th Cir. 1983). But see Mason City Center Assoc. v. City of Mason, 468 F. Supp.
737, 74243 (N.D. Iowa 1979).
51. 679 F.3d 805 (10th Cir. 1982).
52. 498 F. Supp 1205 (D. Colo. 1981)
53. 679 F.2d at 808-811.
54. CoLO. REV. STAT. § 414401 (1973).
55. There is no recorded legislative history for Colorado Revised Statute § 41-4401 (1973).
No Colorado caselaw has discussed the purpose of the statute. Therefore, any effort to
determine legislative intent would be speculative. The dichotomy between governmental
and private power, however, is important in a number of areas. In some states, sovereign
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not authorized. One municipality could require all fixed base operators to
purchase fuel from a city owned storage facility, while another municipality
could allow purchases from private fuel companies. Both methods of fuel
storage and distribution constitute the operation of an airport, and are
public governmental functions permitted by the state. The statute
therefore failed to indicate that the Colorado Legislature clearly articulated or affirmatively expressed a state policy to displace competition
and the exemption should not have been granted.
In Gold Cross & Trans. v. City of Kansas City,56 the Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals held that Kansas City's contract with a single ambulance
company was exempt from the antitrust laws. During the 1970's, Kansas
City had contracts with a number of ambulance operators. The city became
dissatisfied with the system, however, because the operators tended to concentrate on answering non-emergency calls which were more profitable
than emergency calls. To alleviate these problems, Kansas City contracted
with a single operator who provided complete service for the entire city. To
determine if Kansas City was entitled to an exemption, the court looked to
two elements: (1) legislative authorization of the challenged activity; and (2)
proof that the legislature authorized the activity with the intent to displace
competition. 57 The most important factor in the Gold Cross case was a
Missouri statute which empowered municipalities to contract with "One or
more operators."5 8 The Court held that this statute indicated an express
authorization by the Missouri legislature to allow municipalities to enter into exclusive contracts. 69 The court also noted that the State of Missouri had

56.
57.
58.

59.

immunity is granted to municipalities when the municipality is engaged in a governmental function. 18 E. McQUILLAN, THE LAW OF MuNiciPAL CoRPoRATioNs, § 53.02 (1977).
In 1913, Colorado first recognized the distinction between governmental powers and
private powers in a tort action against the City of Denver. Versagoth v. City of Denver,
19 Colo. App. 473, 76 P. 539 (1904). The Colorado Supreme Court finally abolished the
doctrine of sovereign immunity in 1971. Evans v. Board of County Comm rs of County of
El Paso, 144 Colo. 97, 482 P.2d 968 (1971). Colorado Revised Statute § 41-4401 (1973)
was promulgated in 1945, and the statute has not been amended. Therefore, it is highly
probable that the legislature declared the operation of an airport to be a public governmental function in order to prevent tort liability.
705 F.2d 1005, 1015 (8th Cir. 1983).
Id. at 1011.
Id. See also Mo. REV. STAT. § 67.300 (1966) which provides in part:
1. Any county, city, town or village may provide a general ambulance service for the purpose of transporting sick or injured persons to a hospital, clinic,
sanatorium or other place for treatment of the illness or injury, and for that
purpose may
(1) Acquire by gift or purchase one or more motor vehiclas suitable for
such purpose and may supply and equip the same with such materials and
facilities as are necessary for emergency treatment, and may operate, maintain, repair and replace such vehicles, supplies and equipment:
(2) Contract with one or more individuals, municipalities, counties,
associations or other organizations for the operation, maintenance and repair
of such vehicles and for the furnishing of emergency treatment;
It could be argued that the Missouri statute is neutral toward anticompetitive conduct.
Clearly, under Missouri Revised Statute § 67.300 (1966), one municipality could grant an
exclusive contract while another could choose free market competition. The statute is different from Colorado Revised Statute § 414-401 (1973) because here the legislature
authorized the municipality to contract with a single operator. By authorizing the
municipality to contract with a single operator, the Missouri Legislature affirmatively addressed anticompetitive municipal action, and thus legislative intent to authorize anticompetitive conduct may be inferred. Once legislative intent to displace competition may
be inferred, a position of state neutrality is acceptable. Neither Lafayette nor Boulder required that the state compel the anticompetitive conduct. See supra notes 17-25, notes
4049 and accompanying text.
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given municipalities broad regulatory powers over ambulance operators.
Missouri law also provided that even if the state had granted a state ambulance operator's license, the licensed operator was prohibited from
operating in a municipality absent a municipal ordinance which granted a
franchise to the operator. 60 Finding that the Missouri legislature had expressly authorized the challenged activity, the court concluded the
legislative intent to displace competition could be inferred from the statute
authorizing municipalities to contract with one or more operators. 6 1
The court went on to hold that active state supervision was not required. 62 The court distinguished Midcal, noting that the defendants in
Mideal were private parties, while the defendant in the instant case was a
politically accountable governmental entity. The court also expressed concern that dual city and state government regulation would be wasteful and
duplicative. Also, state attempts to encourage and promote local autonomy
could be frustrated.
In Toum of Hallie v. City of Eau Claire,6 3 the Seventh Circuit found
that the City of Eau Claire was exempt from antitrust laws. Eau Claire had
built a sewage treatment plant. Because there were no other facilities in
the area, Eau Claire had a monopoly over sewerage treatment services.
After the sewage treatment facility was completed, four surrounding
towns sought to collect sewage from their residents and transport the
sewage to Eau Claire's sewage treatment plant. Eau Claire refused to provide treatment service unless the towns agreed to be annexed. The surrounding towns brought an antitrust action claiming that Eau Claire was
using a monopoly in sewage treatment to monopolize the collection and
transportation of sewage.
The surrounding towns correctly argued that an exemption would not
be available unless Eau Claire had monopolized sewage collection and
treatment services pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy. The court rejected the towns' argument, finding that
Eau Claire would be exempt if a state policy authorized the construction
and operation of Eau Claire's sewage treatment facility and further
64
authorized Eau Claire to refuse sewage service beyond its city limits.
The Seventh Circuit did not apply the Boulder test, instead it relied
upon the Lafayette state authorization test.6 The court found that two
Wisconsin statutes indicated that the state lagislature had contemplated
anticompetitive conduct. The first statute authorized Wisconsin
municipalities to fix the area in which to provide sewage services, and expressly provided that a municipality had no obligation to extend service
beyond the chosen area. 66 The second statute provided that the Wisconsin
60. 705 F.2d at 1012.

61. Id. at 1013.
62. Id. at 1014-15.
63. 700 F.2d at 376.
64. Id. at 381.

65. Id. at 381-82.
66. Id. at 382 n.13. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 66.069(2) (c) (1983) provides:
Notwithstanding § 196.58(5), each village or city may by ordinance fix the
limits of such service in unincorporated areas. Such ordinance shall delineate
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Department of Natural Resources could order a municipality to extend
sewage services, but the order became void of the party receiving service
refused to be annexed. 67 The court found that the statutes created a "clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy not to burden
municipalities with providing services," unless the municipality could annex the area to be served.68 The court also found that Eau Claire's
monopolization of sewage services was a foreseeable and reasonable consequence of the state policy. Therefore, the court could conclude that the
Wisconsin Legislature must have contemplated the challenged anticompetitive conduct.8 9
Under the analysis set forth in the Midcal and Boulder decisions, the
Seventh Circuit should have analyzed whether Wisconsin had a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to allow the monopolization of sewage collection and treatment services. The court, however,
began its analysis by finding a state policy which did not require a
municipality to provide sewage services beyond its own territory. After
finding the existence of this policy, the court concluded that the Wisconsin
Legislature must have contemplated the monopolization of sewage collection and transportation services. The "clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy" test, however, requires more than
"contemplation," the state policy must be "forthrightly state[d] and clear
in purpose" to allow the challenged activity.70 The Seventh Circuit should
have denied the exemption, because Eau Claire had not acted pursuant to a
clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy.
71
The court also found that active state supervision was not required.
As in the Gold Cross case, the court distinguished Midcal because Eau
Claire was a local government unit performing a traditional municipal function. The court reasoned that where a municipality had operated pursuant
to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy supervision
would be unnecessary. The court also expressed concern that active state
supervision would erode the local autonomy of municipalities and waste
limited resources of state governments.

In CentralIowa Refuse Systems v. Des Moines Metro Sol. Waste,72 the
Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held that a solid waste disposal agency was
exempt from the antitrust laws. In Central Iowa, fifteen Iowa
municipalities entered into an intergovernmental agreement and formed
the area within which service will be provided and the municipal utility shall
have no obligation to serve beyond the area so delineated. Such area may be
enlarged by a subsequent ordinance. No such ordinance shall be effective to
limit any obligation to serve which may have existed at the time the ordinance
was adopted.
67. 700 F.2d at 382 n.14. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 144.07 (1983) provides in pertinent part:
If an application for an annexation referendum under § 66.024(4) is against the
annexation, the order shall be void. If an annexation proceeding is not commenced within the 90-day period, the order shall be effective.
68. Id. at 383.

69. Id.

70. California Retail Liquor Dealers Association v. Midcal Aluminum, Inc., 445 U.S. 97, 105

(1980).

71. 700 F.2d at 383-84.
72. 715 F.2d 419 (1983).
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the Metropolitan Solid Waste Disposal Agency. The Solid Waste Agency
constructed and operated a sanitary landfill. The municipalities contracted
directly with the Agency. Under the contract terms, each municipality
agreed that all solid waste generated in its jurisdiction would be disposed of
at the Agency's landfill. The contract provisions were placed in the agreement on the advice of the Agency's bond consultants, who believed that the
Agency's bonds would be unmarketable unless the anticompetitive provisions were intluded in the contract. 73 The owner of a private solid waste
facility brought an antitrust action against the agency alleging that the
Agency had monopolized or attempted to monopolize solid waste disposal.
Similar to the Seventh Circuit's reliance in Hallie, the court relied on
the Lafayette decision and readily acknowledged that the Iowa legislature
had not expressly authorized the formation of monopolistic municipal
waste disposal facilities. 74 The court held, however, that there was a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition.7 5 In Central Iowa, the Iowa legislature had required that revenue
bonds issued for the construction of solid waste facilities had to be paid
solely out of revenue realized from the operation of the facility. 76 The court
assumed that if the municipalities had not placed the anti-competitive provisions in the contract, the solid waste disposal facility would not be selfsupporting. Therefore, the Iowa legislature must have foreseen that
municipalities would engage in anti-competitive conduct. 77 Thus, the anticompetitive provisions had been authorized by the Iowa legislature.
The municipal action exemption analysis involves two steps. First, the
court must determine the nature of the challenged anticompetitive conduct. Secondly, the court must look to state law to determine whether the
state legislature has a policy forthrightly stated and declared in purpose, to
allow the challenged anticompetitive conduct.78
The Eighth Circuit's decision in Gold Cross was consistent with the
Boulder decision. In Gold Cross the statute authorizing municipalities to
contract with "one or more" operators constituted clearly articulated and
affirmatively expressed a state policy allowing municipalities to create
monopolistic ambulance service.79 The statute forthrightly stated that
monopolistic service was authorized. The Pueblo decision was inconsistent
with both the Boulder and Lafayette decisions, however, because the Colorado legislature had not even addressed or contemplated the challenged
restraint.8 0 In Hallieand CentralIowa, the courts did not analyze whether
the state had authorized the challenged restraint. Instead, the courts
granted an exemption after finding a state policy from which it could be inferred that the legislature must have contemplated the "conduct complained of." Under the Boulder case, mere legislative contemplation of anti73. Id. at 422.
74. Id. at 426-27.
75. Id. at 426-28.
76. Id. at 427.
77. Id.
78. See aupra note 38 and accompanying text.
79. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
80. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
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competitive conduct was held not sufficient to exempt a municipality from
the antitrust laws. 8 '
THE MUNICIPAL ACTION EXEMPTION AND
WYOMING CITIES AND TOWNS
In applying the municipal action exemption test the court must look to
state law8 2 and to determine whether the municipality has acted pursuant
to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace
competition. In Wyoming, there are few statutes from which it may be inferred that the legislature contemplated anticompetitive municipal practices or affirmatively expressed a clearly articulated policy to displace
competition.
Ambulance Serice
The Wyoming legislature has not expressly authorized municipalities
to regulate or operate ambulance services. Municipalities are impliedly empowered to regulate and operate ambulance services through the Wyoming
Emergency Medical Medical Services."8 The Wyoming Emergency Medical
Services Act, and regulations promulgated pursuant to the Act, however,
contain no indication that the legislature intended to authorize anticompetitive conduct.8 4 Although not expressly empowered by Wyoming
statute, Wyoming municipalities have the power to contract with private
ambulance services by virtue of the Home Rule Amendment to the Wyoming Constitution. 5 Under the Court's analysis in Boulder, however, the
power granted to municipalities by Wyoming Home Rule Amendment is
affirmatively exmuch too broad to constitute a clearly articulated and
6
pressed policy authorizing anticompetitive conduct.8
Thus, if a Wyoming municipality granted an exclusive franchise to a
private ambulance service, or alternatively undertook to establish
monopolisitic ambulance service, the Wyoming municipality would not be
exempt from the antitrust laws.
Airport Operation
The Wyoming Legislature has empowered municipal corporations to
acquire property for airport purposes, and to construct, maintain, and
operate airport facilities. Section 10-5-101 of the Wyoming Statutes provides in pertinent part:
81. See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
82. Although statutory law will be the main source of state law, state judicial opinions and administrative regulations may also create a state policy displacing competition. See Bates
v. State Bar of Arizona, 433 U.S. 350 (1977) where the Supreme Court held that ethical
rules promulgated by the Arizona Supreme Court constituted a "clearly and affirmatively expressed" state policy to displace competition by restricting lawyer advertising. See
supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. In Cantor, the court held that a private corporation was not exempt, because a state regulatory commission had not compelled its
lightbulb distribution program. The Court's analysis implies that an agency acting within
the scope of its statutory authority may create a state policy displacing competition.
83. WYO. STAT. S 33-36-108(a) (iv) (1977).
84. Id.
85. WYO. CONST. art. 13, § 1.

86. See supra notes 40-47 and accompanying text.
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(a) Municipal corporations and counties within the state are
authorized at the discretion of their governing boards, acting
either singly or jointly to:
(i) Acquire, by lease, purchase, or otherwise, lands and
other property for airport purposes, and to construct, maintain
and operate these facilities for the landing, housing, care and
departure of air-borne craft;
(ii) Construct, maintain and operate terminal office and
traffic control buildings; warehouses, barracks; meteorology
facilities, maintenance, repair and assembly shops; runways
and taxiing strips; accommodations for mail, freight and express services; and all other attendant facilities;
(iv) Lease or let any portion of the area, buildings or
facilities to any private person or corporation, upon terms
deemed satisfactory. Notice shall be given by publication at
least once a week for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper
published in a town or county in which the airport is located
when it is proposed that all the area and total facilities are to be

leased; ...

7

The provisions authorizing municipalities to construct, acquire, purchase, and lease airports do not expressly or impliedly authorize monopoly
service. The provision authorizing municipalities to 'lease or let any portion
of the area, buildings, or facilities to any private person or corporation,"
however, indicates legislative intent to displace competition. The language
is similar to the statute involved in the Gold Cross decision which provides
that a municipality could contract with "one or more operators."8 8 A
Wyoming municipality may not be subject to an antitrust violation if it leased an entire airport facility to a single operator.
Solid Waste Collection
The Wyoming Legislature has not expressly authorized municipal solid
waste collection service. Although municipalities may have the power to
regulate or provide solid waste services under the Home Rule Amendment
to the Wyoming Constitution, 9 the Home Rule Amendment does not address anti-competitive conduct. Therefore, there is not a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition in solid
waste collection.
Solid Waste Disposal
The Wyoming Legislature has empowered municipalities to plan,
create, construct, and equip liquid and solid waste facilities. Section
15-7-101 of the Wyoming Statutes provides in pertinent part:
(a) In addition to all other powers provided by law, any city or
town may make public improvements as follows for which bonds
may be issued to the contractor or be sold as provided in this
Chapter to:
87. WYO. STAT. § 10-5-101 (1977).
88. See supra notes 56-62 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 84.
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(xi) Plan, create, construct and equip liquid and solid waste
facilities. To carry out this power or to prevent pollution or injury to the environment, any city or town may go beyond its
corporate limits and take, hold and acquire property by purchase or otherwise, or in joint effort with cities, towns, counties or special districts. Cities or towns may enact ordinances
and make all necessary rules and regulations for the government and protection of liquidand solidwaste disposalfacilities,
and fix rates and provide for collection and disposal; ...90
The statute does not expressly authorize anticompetitive action.
Wyoming municipalities may also issue bonds for the construction of solid
and liquid waste facilities. 91 In contrast to the enabling legislation in Central Iowa, revenue bonds do not have to be paid from revenues realized
from operation of the facility.
It might be argued, however, that the legislature authorized anticompetitive practices. The statute provides that municipalities may enact
ordinances and make necessary rules and regulations for the government
and protectionof solid waste disposal facilities.92 A Wyoming municipality
might argue that the legislature intended that "protection," include
economic protection. Thus, the legislature may have authorized anticompetitive ordinances and regulations, in order to protect the financial
viability of municipally constructed solid waste disposal facilities.
Sewerage Systems
The Wyoming Legislature has empowered Wyoming municipalities to
construct and operate sewage systems. Section 15-7-502(a) of the Wyoming
Statutes provides in pertinent part:
Any city or town may construct, reconstruct, improve and extend, or acquire, improve, extend and operate a sewerage system,
within or without its corporate limits and may apply for and accept
loans or grants or any other aid from the United States of America
or any agency or instrumentality thereof under any federal law to
aid in the prevention and abatement of water pollution, or may borrow money from any other source. . .. "93
The statute does not evidence a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition.
Revenue bonds issued for the construction of sewage treatment
facilities, however, have to be paid solely from revenue derived from operation of the facility. 94 Under the authority of Central Iowa, a Wyoming
municipality might argue that the legislature contemplated95anticompetitive
conduct when it imposed the revenue bond requirement.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

Wyo. STAT. § 15-7-107(a) (xi) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 15-7-502(a) (i) (1977).
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
Wyo. STAT. § 15-7-502(a) (i) (1977).
Wyo. STAT. § 15-7-502(a) (ii) (1977).
CentralIowa, however, is not consistent with the Bou/der decision. See supranote 81 and
accompanying text.
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Legislative Solutions
State legislatures have the power to exempt municipalities from the
federal antitrust laws. Boulder requires the existence of a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy to displace competition.
Any state legislature, therefore, may enact legislation which creates a
state policy to displace competition. Several other states have enacted
legislation to exempt municipal activities. North Dakota's legislation
provides:
All immunity of the state from the provisions of the Sherman Antitrust Act [Act July 2, 1890, c.647; 26 Stat. 209; 15 U.S.C. 1 et seq.]
is hereby extended to any city or city governing body acting within
the scope of authority contained in sections 40-05-01, 40-05-02, and
40-05.1-06. When acting within the scope of the grants of authority
contained in sections 40-05-01, 40-05-02, and 40-05.1-06, a city or
city governing 96
body shall be presumed to be acting in furtherance
of state policy.
Statute sections 40-05-01, 40-05-02, and 40-05.1-06 list powers
delegated by the state to its municipalities. Generally, municipalities may
exercise only those powers delegated by the state. 97 The general powers
act simply lists powers that a municipality may exercise. North Dakota's
municipal powers statutes list 103 powers. Consequently, North Dakota's
antitrust exemption is very broad. Maryland's antitrust exemption statutes
immunize four municipal activities, planning and zoning, housing, sewage,
and solid waste disposal.98 The solid waste disposal exemption is typical of
Maryland's statutes exempting municipalities:
It has been and shall continue to be the policy of the state that [each
local governmental unit] is directed and authorized to exercise all
powers regarding waste collection and disposal notwithstanding
any anticompetitive effect. This subsection does not apply to any
portion of a generator's waste which is directed by the generator to
a specific facility for reuse, reclamation or recycling, or for disposal
on its own property. 99
The Illinois legislature has also exempted municipalities from the antitrust laws. The legislation provides:
The General Assembly intends that the "State action exemption" to application of the federal antitrust laws be fully available
96. N.D. CENT CODE § 40-01-22 (1983).

97. City of Buffalo v. Joslyn, 527 P.2d 1106 (Wyo. 1974); 2 E. MCQUILLAN, supra note 55, §
4.03 (1979). In applying the municipal action exemption analysis, the court must look to
state law to find the existence of a state policy displacing competition. Unless the state
legislature has enacted a statute expressly allowing anticompetitive conduct, such as a
blanket exemption statute, the presence of a state policy will be found in constitutional
provision, statutes and caselaw governing the delegation of power from state to local
governments. Although the analysis for finding an antitrust exemption differs from an
analysis of a municipality's power under state law, both analyses may rely on the same
constitutional provisions, statutes and caselaw.
98. ANTITRUST & TRADE REs. REPORTER (B.N.A.) No. 45 at 23, (July 7, 1983).
99. Id.
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to local governments to the extent their activities are either (1) expressly or by necessary implication authorized by Illinois law or (2)
within traditional areas of local government activity. 100
Although a blanket exemption statute may constitute a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy,' 0 ' all anticompetitive
municipal actions under blanket exemptions will not be exempt from the
0 2
antitrust laws. In Star Lines Ltd. v. Puerto Rico Maritime Ship. Auth.,1
the District Court for the Southern District of New York held that a
blanket antitrust exemption was insufficient to immunize a state agency
from the federal antitrust laws. The statutory exemption provided:
-Conflicting Laws Inapplicable.-Insofar as the provisions of this
act are in conflict with the provisions of any other law, or parts
thereof, the provisions of this act shall prevail. Specifically, and
without otherwise limiting the generality of the foregoing, it is intended by this act that the Antitrust Laws shall not be applicable to
any actionof the Authority taken pursuant to the provisionshere.10 3
Decided shortly after Lafayette, the court concluded that the state agency
was not acting pursuant to a state policy to displace competition. 0 4 The
agency, the Puerto Rico Maritime Shipping Authority, was established to
own and regulate all forms of commercial freight shipping between Puerto
Rico and other nations. The Authority had contracted with a shipping company to provide freight service between Puerto Rico and the East Coast
and the Persian Gulf. The court denied the exemption because the nature of
the Authority's actions were not contemplated by the Puerto Rico
Legislature. 05 Thus, under the court's analysis, the blanket antitrust
statute was valid only so long as the governmental entity had acted within
the scope of its powers as contemplated by the state legislature. Thus, if a
municipality operating pursuant to a blanket exemption statute acts
beyond the scope its delegated powers it will be subject to the antitrust
laws.
100. 1983 ILL LAws 5548.
101. One Commentator argues that the blanket exemption statutes do not constitute a clearly
articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy, because they do not authorize
specific anticompetitive practices. B. Civiletti, The Fallout from Community Communications Co. v. City of Boulder: Prospectsfor a Legislative Solution, 32 CATH. L.
REV. 379, 390 (1983). The commentator's argument has some support from the Midcal
Aluminum decision. In Midcal, the Court found a clearly articulated and affirmatively
expressed state policy because the state had authorized the specific conduct that was
challenged. The Court has never analyzed the validity of a blanket exemption statute. The
Court held in Boulder, however, that the state action exemption was based on principles
of federalism. Where a state clearly indicated that the antitrust laws should not apply to
municipalities principles of federalism would require the court to find a clearly articulated
and affirmatively expressed state policy to allow anticompetitive actions whether or not
the statute addressed specific anticompetitive action.
102. 451 F. Supp. 157 (S.D.N.Y. 1978).
103. Id. at 162 (quoting Act of Puerto Rico Shipping Authority § 25 (June 10, 1974) (emphasis

in original)).
104. Id. at 16547.
105. Id. at 166-67. See also Westborough Mall Inc. v. City of Cape Girardeau, 693 F.2d 733
(8th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, U.S. -, 103 S.Ct. 2122 (1983), where the Eighth Circuit found that a municipality was not exempt because it had acted beyond the scope of
the state policy allowing anticompetitive zoning actions.
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CONCLUSION

In Boulder, the Court held that municipalities were subject to antitrust
laws unless they had acted pursuant to a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed state policy displacing competition. In applying the test
set forth in Boulder decision, the federal appellate courts have liberally interpreted state statutes in order to exempt municipalities from federal
antitrust law. Several federal appellate courts have granted exemptions,
although there was not a clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed
state policy to displace competition. Even under a similar expansive
reading of the Boulder decision, however, a Wyoming municipality will not
be entitled to an exemption for certain activities, such as ambulance service
or solid waste collection. 10 6 The Wyoming Legislature should enact legislation clearly evidencing an intent to exempt Wyoming and municipalities
from federal antitrust law, and thereby end the present uncertainty over
the municipal action exemption in Wyoming.
G. PAUL HUNTER

106. For a good discussion of methods municipalities may use to avoid antitrust actions, see
LAWYER vii
Slawsky, Can Mutnicipalities Avoid Antitrust Liability?, 14 THE URBA
(1982). For a good discussion of litigation strategies, where an exemption is unavailable,
see Vandestar, Liability of Municipalities Under the Antitrust Laws: Litigation
Strategies, 33 CATH. U.L. REV. 395-409 (1982).
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